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Analyses of judgments

Workers can rely on equal pay rules directly before national courts

Court of JusticeEmployment and social rightsJudgment in Case C-43/758 April 1976

In Defrenne II, the Court held that the equal pay rule in Article 119 of the EEC Treaty can be relied on before national courts. Claims for pay periods before the judgment were generally excluded, except for workers who had already sued or made an equivalent claim.

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The case

The worker was an air hostess for Sabena, a Belgian airline. She claimed compensation because, between 15 February 1963 and 1 February 1966, she was paid less than male colleagues doing the same work as cabin steward [1]. The parties agreed that the work was identical, so the pay discrimination in that period was not disputed [1]. The claim for arrears was limited to that period, because from 1 February 1966 the employer placed hostesses and stewards on the same basic rates [2]. The case reached the Cour du travail in Brussels, a Belgian labour court, on appeal [1][2]. That court asked the Court of Justice, through a preliminary ruling procedure, two questions about Article 119 [1]. The first asked whether the equal pay principle applies directly in national law, so that workers can sue on it. The second asked whether that effect depends on EU measures or on national legislation alone [1].

The question

The Court had to decide whether Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, which requires equal pay for men and women, can be relied on by individuals before national courts without national implementing law [1]. It also had to decide from which date that effect applies, and whether EU or national measures govern it [1].

The outcome

The Court ruled that the equal pay principle in Article 119 may be relied on before national courts, which must protect the rights it gives individuals [1]. These rights cover direct discrimination arising from legislation or collective agreements, and unequal pay for equal work in the same establishment or service, whether private or public [1]. The Court held that application of the principle was to have been fully secured by 1 January 1962 for the original Member States and by 1 January 1973 for the new Member States; the Treaty and the Accession Treaty set these time limits, and the 1961 resolution did not change the first one [1]. Claims for pay periods before the judgment could not rely on Article 119, except for workers who had already brought proceedings or made an equivalent claim [1].

The Court’s reasoning

The Court began by saying that equal pay is one of the foundations of the Community, because it has both an economic and a social aim [1]. It held that Article 119 imposes a specific duty on Member States, to be achieved by the end of the first stage of the transitional period [1]. The Court separated direct discrimination, which can be found by a purely legal analysis, from indirect discrimination, which needs further implementing rules [1]. It rejected arguments that the word 'principle' or the reference to 'Member States' prevented individuals from relying on the provision [1]. It also held that the duty covers collective agreements and contracts between individuals, not only public authorities [1]. The resolution of the Member States of 30 December 1961 could not change the time limit in the Treaty, which can only be amended under Article 236 [1]. Council Directive 75/117 could not reduce the effect of Article 119 [1]. Finally, the Court limited the past effect of the judgment on grounds of legal certainty, pointing to the conduct of several Member States and to the Commission's failure to start proceedings [1].

What the judgment means

On this reading, the main significance of the judgment is that it lets individuals rely on the equal pay rule in Article 119 before national courts, without waiting for national legislation [1]. The Court also held that the duty reaches collective agreements and contracts between individuals, not only public employers [1]. Even where Article 119 has no direct effect, the Court held that the principle may be implemented through a combination of Community and national provisions, so national legislatures do not have exclusive power [1]. The judgment also deals with the 1961 resolution of the Member States, which could not change the time limit in the Treaty, and with Directive 75/117, which did not reduce the effect of Article 119 [1]. On this reading, the limit on past claims is a significant qualification: earlier pay periods are generally excluded unless proceedings were already started or an equivalent claim was made [1]. The judgment answers the questions referred and does not itself assess the pay claim [1]. The Advocate General proposed a narrower view, limited to pay in the strict sense and identical work, but the Court's reasoning does not expressly adopt that limit [2][1]. On this reading, the judgment should be read together with its time limit and its reasons, and how far it reaches beyond the facts of this case is a matter of interpretation. This is an assessment, not legal advice.

How the sources fit together

The Advocate General proposed that Article 119 had direct effect from 1 January 1962 for the original Member States, but only for pay in the strict sense and for work that is the same [2]. The Court agreed that individuals can rely on the provision. It held that application was to have been fully secured by 1 January 1962 and 1 January 1973, and it limited claims about the past, a limit the Advocate General did not propose [1][2]. The case turned on Article 119 and on the 1961 resolution, which the Court held could not change the Treaty time limit [1]. Later judgments cite this case for the temporal limit, taking account only of service after 8 April 1976 for part-time workers' pension rights [3][4]. Other later judgments state that a national rule granting retroactive membership of a pension scheme is not precluded [5][6]. Another later judgment cites it for the point that Article 119 extends to collective agreements and contracts between individuals [7].

From the sources

The principle of equal pay contained in article 119 may be relied upon before the national courts [1]
Important considerations of legal certainty affecting all the interests involved, both public and private, make it impossible in principle to reopen the question of pay as regards the past [1]
The decisive factor in determining what the effects of a Community provision are in national law is not the identity of those to whom it is addressed but its nature [2]

Sources

  1. Judgment in Case C-43/75: Judgment of the Court of 8 April 1976. — Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena. the judgment · 8 April 1976
  2. Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-43/75: Opinion of Mr Advocate General Trabucchi delivered on 10 March 1976. — Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena. the Advocate General's opinion · 10 March 1976
  3. Judgment in Case C-246/96: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 11 December 1997. — Mary Teresa Magorrian and Irene Patricia Cunningham v Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Department of a later judgment that cites this case · 11 December 1997
  4. Judgment in Case C-50/96: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 10 February 2000. — Deutsche Telekom AG v Lilli Schröder. a later judgment that cites this case · 10 February 2000
  5. Judgment in Case C-234/96: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 10 February 2000. — Deutsche Telekom AG v Agnes Vick (C-234/96) and Ute Conze (C-235/96). a later judgment that cites this case · 10 February 2000
  6. Judgment in Case C-270/97: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 10 February 2000. — Deutsche Post AG v Elisabeth Sievers (C-270/97) and Brunhilde Schrage (C-271/97). a later judgment that cites this case · 10 February 2000
  7. Judgment in Case C-33/89: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 June 1990. — Maria Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. a later judgment that cites this case · 27 June 1990