When a top national court must ask the EU Court to interpret EU law
In CILFIT, the Court was asked whether the highest national courts must always refer EU law questions to it. It ruled that they need not do so if the question is irrelevant, already interpreted, or so obvious that no reasonable doubt remains.
The case
Several Italian textile firms, including CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo, paid a health inspection levy on wool imported from outside the Community [2]. They argued that the levy was banned by Regulation (EEC) No 827/68, which prohibits charges with an effect equivalent to customs duties on certain animal products listed in Annex II to the Treaty [1][2]. The Italian Ministry of Health replied that wool is not listed in Annex II and therefore falls outside that regulation [1][2]. The Corte suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) stayed the case and referred a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, meaning an interpretation of EU law [1][2]. It asked whether the duty to refer applies to a court of last instance even where that court sees no reasonable interpretative doubt [1].
The question
The Court had to decide whether a national court of last instance must refer a question of EU law to the Court of Justice even when it considers the answer obvious [1]. It also had to decide whether that duty depends on a prior finding of reasonable interpretative doubt [1].
The outcome
The Court held that the duty to refer applies unless the court has established that the question is irrelevant, that the provision has already been interpreted by the Court, or that the correct application is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt [1]. Before relying on the last exception, the national court must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court [1]. The Court did not decide the wool dispute itself, and it left the decision on costs to the Corte suprema di Cassazione [1].
The Court’s reasoning
The Court began from the cooperation system of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, whose purpose is to prevent divergent judicial decisions on Community law across the Member States [1]. It held that a national court is not obliged to refer a question merely because a party raises it; the court itself decides whether an answer is necessary to give judgment [1]. A court of last instance must refer any question of interpretation that is necessary to decide the case [1]. The Court accepted that an earlier ruling on the same point may remove the duty, and that a court may refer on its own initiative [1]. On the obviousness exception, the Court pointed to features of Community law: texts drafted in several languages that are all equally authentic, Community terminology that differs from national law concepts, and the need to read each provision in its context and in the light of the objectives of Community law [1]. Because of these features, the possibility of no reasonable doubt must be assessed carefully, with the risk of divergent decisions in mind [1].
What the judgment means
On this reading, the judgment sets out the main test that national courts of last instance must apply before deciding not to refer an EU law question [1]. Its central point is that a refusal to refer is allowed only in narrow cases: the question is irrelevant, the Court has already interpreted the provision, or the answer is so obvious that no reasonable doubt remains [1]. On this reading, the third exception needs the most care, because the Court tied it to the particular difficulties of EU law and to the risk of divergent rulings across the Member States [1]. The Court also said that such courts remain entirely at liberty to refer a matter where they consider it appropriate [1]. Later judgments, such as TNT Traco, read the case as leaving the assessment of obviousness to the national court [4]. The judgment does not explain in detail how a national court should test obviousness beyond the conditions it sets, and it does not decide the wool levy dispute itself [1]. This assessment is not advice to any court, and it should not be read as predicting how other cases will be decided [1].
How the sources fit together
The case turned on the third paragraph of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty [1]. Advocate General Capotorti proposed a stricter rule: a court of last instance must refer any question of EU law that arises and has no discretion to judge whether it is well founded [2]. The Court did not adopt that view; it accepted the irrelevance, prior-interpretation and obvious-application exceptions [1][2]. The same wool dispute later came before the Court in another case, which held that the phrase 'ex 05.15 B: animal products not elsewhere specified or included' in the Annex to Regulation No 827/68 does not cover wool [7]. Later judgments cite this case for the comparison of language versions [3][5] and for the national court's responsibility to decide whether a question is obvious [4]. One later case records that a national court mistakenly took CILFIT to release it from the duty to refer [6].
From the sources
The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the community [1]
the case-law as stated in Case 283/81 Cilfit gives the national court sole responsibility for determining whether the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt [4]
it is still under an obligation to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice unless the same question has already been the subject-matter of an interpretation by the Court. [2]
Sources
- Judgment in Case C-283/81: Judgment of the Court of 6 October 1982. — Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health. the judgment · 6 October 1982
- Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-283/81: Opinion of Mr Advocate General Capotorti delivered on 13 July 1982. — Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health. the Advocate General's opinion · 13 July 1982
- Judgment in Case C-236/97: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 17 December 1998. — Skatteministeriet v Aktieselskabet Forsikrinsselskabet Codan. a later judgment that cites this case · 17 December 1998
- Judgment in Case C-340/99: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 17 May 2001. — TNT Traco SpA v Poste Italiane SpA and Others. a later judgment that cites this case · 17 May 2001
- Judgment in Case C-72/95: Judgment of the Court of 24 October 1996. — Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland. a later judgment that cites this case · 24 October 1996
- Judgment in Case C-453/00: Judgment of the Court of 13 January 2004. — Kühne & Heitz NV v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren. a later judgment that cites this case · 13 January 2004
- Judgment in Case C-77/83: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 29 February 1984. — Srl CILFIT and others and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministero della sanità. another EU document with similar content · 29 February 1984