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Analyses of judgments

Residence under EU law does not always require immediate entry

Court of JusticeMigration and free movementJudgment in Case C-230/1727 June 2018

The question was whether EU law prevents a Member State from refusing a third-country family member a derived right of residence when entry does not follow naturally from the Union citizen's return. The Court of Justice held that it does not, provided an overall assessment is made.

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The case

A Turkish national lived with his mother in Turkey [1]. His father had married a Danish national, and they lived together in Sweden from 2012 to 2014 [1]. The Turkish national visited them in Sweden on two occasions in 2013 and 2014 [1]. The Danish national and the father returned to Denmark in October 2014 [1]. The Turkish national entered Denmark in June 2015 and in July 2015 applied for an EU residence card as a family member of the Danish national [1]. The State Administration refused, because the application had not been submitted as a natural consequence of the Danish national's return [1]. The Immigration Service upheld the refusal [1].

The question

More precisely, the question was whether Article 21(1) TFEU, read with Directive 2004/38 applied by analogy, precludes the legislation of a Member State under which a third-country family member is not granted a derived right of residence if he does not enter or apply for a residence card as a natural consequence of the Union citizen's return [1].

The outcome

The Court of Justice held that Article 21(1) TFEU does not preclude such legislation, as long as the legislation requires an overall assessment in which other relevant factors are also taken into account [1]. What matters is whether the family life created or strengthened in the host Member State has not ended [1]. The referring court must verify this [1]. The claimants did not succeed in arguing that the condition was in itself contrary to EU law [1].

The Court’s reasoning

The Court of Justice relied on Article 21(1) TFEU and on the need for the Union citizen's right of free movement to be fully effective [1]. If a Union citizen has genuinely resided in another Member State in accordance with Directive 2004/38, and family life was created or strengthened there, effectiveness requires that the family life can continue on return to the Member State of origin [1]. This requires that the third-country family member be granted a derived right of residence [1]. The Court of Justice stated that the conditions for such a right of residence should in principle not be stricter than those under Directive 2004/38, which is therefore applied by analogy [1]. Article 7(2) of the directive covers both family members who accompany the Union citizen and those who join the Union citizen [1]. There is therefore no condition that the family member must enter within a certain period [1]. The authorities may, however, examine whether the family life was interrupted before the family member's entry [1]. A long time lag is a relevant indication, but not in itself decisive [1]. Reasons such as personal circumstances, profession or education may explain a delay [1]. An overall assessment must determine whether there is a link to the Union citizen's earlier exercise of the right of free movement [1].

What the judgment means

On this reading, the judgment shows that a condition of 'natural consequence' is not in itself contrary to EU law [1]. The judgment extends to cases where a Union citizen returns to the Member State of which he is a national after a stay in another Member State, and a third-country family member seeks a derived right of residence [1]. It does not decide whether a family life had actually been created or strengthened in the host Member State, because the authorities had not assessed that [1]. Nor does it lay down any specific time limit [1]. On this reading, the judgment therefore cannot be read as a general prohibition on requiring a natural consequence [1]. Nor can it be used to establish that a particular applicant has a right of residence; that requires an assessment of the specific case [1]. The Danish decisions show that the Immigration Appeals Board has referred a case back because the conditions did not appear to have been assessed in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice [2]. Other decisions have emphasised whether the stay was genuine and whether the family life had been interrupted [3][4][5]. On this reading, the judgment stresses in particular that a long time between the return and the entry is a relevant factor, but not decisive on its own [1].

How the sources fit together

The judgment concerned Article 21(1) TFEU and Directive 2004/38 applied by analogy [1]. The Court of Justice decided the case without an Opinion from the Advocate General [1]. It relied on Article 7(1) and (2) of the directive, and on the fact that family members can both accompany and join the Union citizen [1]. In Danish practice, the Immigration Appeals Board has used the judgment in cases on secondary movement [2][3][4][5]. One case was referred back because the conditions did not appear to have been assessed in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice [2]. In other cases, the stay on a boat was regarded as holiday-like [3], and the family life was regarded as interrupted [4][5]. One decision expressly states that the applicant did not enter as a natural consequence of the Danish national's return [5].

From the sources

provided that such rules require, in the context of an overall assessment, that other relevant factors also be taken into account [1]
Accordingly, the fact that the submission of the application for a residence permit was not ‘a natural consequence’ of the return of the Union citizen is a relevant factor which, although not decisive in itself, may, in the context of an overall assessment, lead the Member State of origin of the Union citizen in question to conclude that there is no link between the application and the exercise by that citizen of his freedom of movement and, consequently, to refuse to issue such a residence permit. [1]

Sources

  1. Judgment in Case C-230/17: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 27 June 2018. — Erdem Deha Altiner and Isabel Hanna Ravn v Udlændingestyrelsen. the judgment · 27 June 2018
  2. KEN nr 10298 af 21/11/2019: Udlændingenævnets afgørelse af 21. november 2019 – EU – Sekundær bevægelighed – Betingelser ej opfyldt – Naturlig forlængelse a Danish decision or document that cites the judgment · 14 February 2020
  3. KEN nr 9403 af 15/03/2023: Udlændingenævnets afgørelse af 15. marts 2023 – EU – Sekundær bevægelighed – Betingelser ej opfyldt – Reelt og faktisk ophold a Danish decision or document that cites the judgment · 17 May 2023
  4. KEN nr 9944 af 16/01/2024: Udlændingenævnets afgørelse af 16. januar 2024 – EU – Sekundær bevægelighed – Betingelser ej opfyldt – familieliv – familielivet afbrudt a Danish decision or document that cites the judgment · 8 November 2024
  5. KEN nr 10295 af 17/10/2024: Udlændingenævnets afgørelse af 17. oktober 2024 – EU - sekundær bevægelighed – betingelser ej opfyldt – familieliv afbrudt a Danish decision or document that cites the judgment · 19 March 2025