Marshall: forcing a woman to retire at 60 breached EU equal treatment
In Marshall, the Court of Justice asked whether dismissing a woman after the state pension age of 60, when men could work until 65, was sex discrimination, and whether she could invoke the directive against a public employer. It answered yes to both.
The case
The worker was employed by a health authority in England from 1966 and worked as a senior dietician from 1974 [1]. Since 1975 the authority's policy was that the normal retirement age is the age at which state pensions become payable [1]. State pensions were paid to women from 60 and to men from 65, but the law did not force anyone to retire then [1]. On 31 March 1980, about four weeks after she turned 62, the authority dismissed her, although she wanted to work until 65 [1]. The only reason was that she was a woman past the retirement age applied to women [1]. A tribunal rejected her claim under UK law, which allows differences in retirement, but upheld her claim under an EU directive [1]. An appeal tribunal held she could not rely on the directive [1]. The Court of Appeal, noting that the authority was an 'emanation of the State', referred two questions to the Court of Justice [1].
The question
First, is it sex discrimination under Directive 76/207 to dismiss a woman because she has passed the state pension age that is lower for women than for men [1]? Second, if so, can she rely on the directive in national courts against a public authority that employs her [1]?
The outcome
The Court held that dismissing a woman solely because she has reached a state pension age that differs for men and women is discrimination on grounds of sex, contrary to the directive [1]. It also held that she can rely on the directive against a state authority acting as employer [1]. The worker therefore won on both questions [1].
The Court’s reasoning
On the first question, the Court said the case was not about access to a pension. It concerned an age limit for ending employment under a general dismissal policy, so it fell under Directive 76/207 [1]. Article 5(1) guarantees men and women the same working conditions, including conditions governing dismissal, and 'dismissal' has a wide meaning [1]. The directive on social security allows Member States to exclude the determination of pensionable age and its consequences for other benefits. Because equal treatment is so fundamental, the Court read that exception strictly [1]. This case concerned dismissal, not the consequences of pensionable age for benefits [1]. On the second question, the Court repeated that clear and unconditional directive provisions may be relied on against the State if it has not implemented the directive correctly [1]. A directive binds only Member States, so it cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual [1]. But a person may rely on it against the State whether it acts as employer or as public authority, so the State cannot profit from its own failure to comply [1]. Article 5(1) is a general and unequivocal ban on sex discrimination, and Member States cannot limit it or attach conditions [1]. It is for the national court to apply this, and the Court of Appeal had called the authority a public authority [1].
What the judgment means
This is an assessment, based only on the sources. On this reading, Marshall rests on one main principle. A person may rely on a clear, unconditional directive provision against the State, whatever role the State plays, including that of employer [1][3]. The judgment also draws a limit. A directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot be relied on as such against one [1]. On this reading, the ruling therefore did not give private-sector workers the same route against their employers. The Court explained that any resulting gap is for the Member State to close by implementing the directive correctly [1]. The ruling also seems narrow in other respects. The Court did not decide whether a given body counts as part of the State. It left this to the national court and only noted that the Court of Appeal had called the authority a public authority [1]. On pensions, the Court did not remove the exception for pensionable age. It said the exception covers only pensionable age and its consequences for other benefits, and not dismissal [1]. Whether other situations fit these limits would depend on their own facts.
How the sources fit together
The Advocate General reached the same answer on the first question. He held that a retirement age is a working condition, not a pensionable age, so the social security exception did not apply [2]. On the second question he also held that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual, and that the State is to be treated as one whole, whichever role it plays [2]. The Court followed this approach [1]. Later judgments have used the case. One cites paragraph 49 for the point that the State can be relied on whether it acts as employer or as public authority [3]. Another cites paragraph 55 for Article 5 being precise and unconditional [6]. Two others cite it for the rule that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual [5][7]. A further judgment in the same dispute notes that the dismissal's illegality was not contested after the 1986 ruling [4].
From the sources
where a person is able to rely on a directive as against the State he may do so regardless of the capacity in which the latter is acting, whether as employer or as public authority [3]
It is necessary to prevent the state from taking advantage of its own failure to comply with community law [1]
a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and, consequently, a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against such a person [7]
Article 5 of Directive 76/207 does not confer on the Member States the right to limit the application of the principle of equal treatment in its field of operation or subject it to conditions [6]
Sources
- Judgment in Case C-152/84: Judgment of the Court of 26 February 1986. — M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching). the judgment · 26 February 1986
- Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-152/84: Opinion of Mr Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn delivered on 18 September 1985. — M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Au the Advocate General's opinion · 18 September 1985
- Judgment in Case C-188/89: Judgment of the Court of 12 July 1990. — A. Foster and others v British Gas plc. a later judgment that cites this case · 12 July 1990
- Judgment in Case C-271/91: Judgment of the Court of 2 August 1993. — M. Helen Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority. a later judgment that cites this case · 2 August 1993
- Judgment in Case C-235/03: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 10 March 2005. — QDQ Media SA v Alejandro Omedas Lecha. a later judgment that cites this case · 10 March 2005
- Judgment in Case C-345/89: Judgment of the Court of 25 July 1991. — Criminal proceedings against Alfred Stoeckel. a later judgment that cites this case · 25 July 1991
- Judgment in Case C-106/89: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 13 November 1990. — Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA. a later judgment that cites this case · 13 November 1990