Court voids EU-US Privacy Shield but keeps standard data contract clauses
In Schrems II, the Court asked whether EU personal data sent to the US under standard contract clauses is adequately protected against US surveillance. It kept the clauses valid but declared the EU-US Privacy Shield invalid.
The case
The applicant, an Austrian user of Facebook, complained that his personal data was transferred from Facebook Ireland to its parent company Facebook Inc. in the United States [1]. Most of these transfers relied on standard data protection clauses in a Commission decision from 2010 [1]. The applicant argued that US public authorities could access the data for surveillance and that the clauses could not stop this [1]. The Irish Data Protection Commissioner shared doubts about the transfers and asked the High Court to seek a ruling from the Court of Justice [1]. The case also covered the EU-US Privacy Shield, a 2016 Commission decision finding that the United States ensured an adequate level of protection [1]. The Commission had relied on US surveillance rules and an ombudsperson to reach that finding [1].
The question
The Court had to decide whether standard contract clauses can give adequate protection to EU personal data sent to a third country whose authorities may access it for national security [1]. It also had to decide whether the Privacy Shield Decision was valid [1].
The outcome
The clauses decision was held valid, because controllers and supervisory authorities must suspend transfers where the clauses cannot be complied with [1]. The Privacy Shield Decision was declared invalid, because US surveillance and the ombudsperson did not offer essentially equivalent protection [1]. The outcome was therefore mixed, with the Privacy Shield losing in full [1].
The Court’s reasoning
The Court first held that the GDPR applies to a commercial transfer of personal data from an EU company to a company in a third country, even if the data may later be processed by that country's authorities for national security [1]. The exceptions in Article 2(2) must be read strictly, and the possibility of later national security processing does not remove the transfer from the regulation [1]. Protection must be essentially equivalent to that in the EU, read in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [1]. Standard clauses bind only the exporter and importer, not the authorities of a third country, so the controller may need supplementary measures [1]. The clauses decision was therefore upheld, because it provides effective mechanisms to suspend or prohibit transfers when the clauses are breached or cannot be honoured [1]. On the Privacy Shield, the Court found that Section 702 of the FISA and Executive Order 12333 set no clear limits and gave no enforceable rights to data subjects [1]. The ombudsperson was not independent enough and had no power to bind the intelligence services, so there was no cause of action before a body offering equivalent guarantees [1]. Article 1 was therefore incompatible with the GDPR read with the Charter, and the whole decision fell [1].
What the judgment means
On this reading, the judgment's main contribution is to make clear that a transfer to a third country must be checked against the level of protection the EU requires, including how that country's public authorities can access the data [1]. Controllers that rely on standard clauses must assess that case by case and may need extra safeguards [1]. On this reading, the judgment does not say which supplementary measures would be enough in a given country, leaving that to case-by-case checks [1]. It also does not decide whether any particular transfer is lawful; that remains for the controller and the supervisory authority to assess [1]. The Court grouped several of the referred questions together, so not every question is answered in the same detail [1]. This assessment is not legal advice, and it does not predict how other cases will be decided [1].
How the sources fit together
The Advocate General's opinion suggested that the Court should not rule on the Privacy Shield, and set out in the alternative why he doubted its validity [2]. The Court did rule on it and declared it invalid [1], so it did not follow that suggestion. On the clauses, the Advocate General found nothing to affect their validity [2], and the Court reached the same result [1]. Later judgments cite this case for the supervisory authority's duty to act with due diligence on complaints [3][4], and for the rule that limits on fundamental rights must be provided for by law [5].
From the sources
That level of protection must therefore be guaranteed irrespective of the provision of that chapter on the basis of which a transfer of personal data to a third country is carried out. [1]
the supervisory authority is required, under Article 58(2)(f) and (j) of that regulation, to suspend or prohibit a transfer of personal data to a third country [1]
Article 1 of the Privacy Shield Decision is incompatible with Article 45(1) of the GDPR, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter, and is therefore invalid. [1]
Sources
- Judgment in Case C-311/18: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2020. — Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems. the judgment · 16 July 2020
- Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-311/18: Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe delivered on 19 December 2019. — Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian the Advocate General's opinion · 19 December 2019
- Judgment in Case C-46/23: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 14 March 2024. — Budapest Főváros IV. Kerület Újpest Önkormányzat Polgármesteri Hivatala v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság a later judgment that cites this case · 14 March 2024
- Judgment in Case C-26/22: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 December 2023. — UF and AB v Land Hessen. a later judgment that cites this case · 7 December 2023
- Judgment in Case C-401/19: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 April 2022. — Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union. a later judgment that cites this case · 26 April 2022