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Analyses of judgments

Can a national court set aside a national rule that blocks urgent protection of EU rights?

Court of JusticeInstitutions and the rule of lawJudgment in Case C-213/8919 June 1990

In Factortame, the question was whether a national court must set aside a national rule that blocks interim relief over a right under EU law. The Court ruled that it must, where that rule is the sole obstacle to such relief.

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The case

The companies challenged the UK Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which changed the rules for registering British fishing vessels [1]. The Act required vessels to be British-owned, managed and controlled from the United Kingdom, and operated by qualified persons or companies [1]. The companies owned 95 fishing vessels, 53 of which had originally been registered in Spain, and at the time none of them met the conditions for the new register [1]. Because the vessels would lose the right to fish from 1 April 1989, the companies applied for judicial review and asked for interim relief until final judgment [1]. The Divisional Court granted interim relief and referred questions on EU law to the Court of Justice [1]. The Court of Appeal set that order aside, because national courts had no power to suspend Acts of Parliament [1]. The House of Lords agreed that national law gave it no such power and referred two questions to the Court of Justice [1].

The question

The Court had to decide whether EU law requires a national court to set aside a national rule that is the sole obstacle to granting interim relief on rights claimed under EU law [1]. The referred questions also asked whether EU law obliges or empowers courts to grant such protection, and on what criteria [1].

The outcome

The Court ruled that a national court which considers that the sole obstacle to interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside that rule [1]. The Court took the House of Lords' finding on national law as its starting point [1]. The judgment does not itself declare a winner, and it left the decision on costs to the national court [1]. The Court answered the question on setting the rule aside and did not go on to decide the substance of the rights claimed [1][2].

The Court’s reasoning

The Court began from the principle of primacy: directly applicable EU rules must be fully and uniformly applied in all Member States, and conflicting national provisions are automatically inapplicable [1]. Relying on its earlier case-law, including Ariete and Mireco, it recalled that national courts must protect the rights that individuals derive from the direct effect of EU provisions, under the duty of cooperation in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty [1]. Any national provision or practice that stops a court from setting aside national rules that prevent EU rules from having full effect is incompatible with EU law [1]. The Court then reasoned that full effectiveness would be just as much impaired if a national rule stopped a court from granting interim relief to secure the effect of its final judgment on the rights claimed [1]. It held that a court that would grant such relief but for a national rule must set aside that rule [1]. The Court also relied on Article 177, the preliminary ruling procedure. A court that has stayed proceedings pending the Court's answer should not be unable to grant interim relief until it gives judgment after that answer, because that would weaken the system [1]. The Court therefore answered that EU law requires the national court to set aside the national rule in that situation [1].

What the judgment means

On this reading, the judgment establishes that a national court applying EU law may not be blocked by a national rule from granting interim protection when that rule is the only obstacle [1]. The reasoning rests on the duty to make EU rights effective and on the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure [1]. On this reading, the ruling is narrower than a general statement that courts may always suspend national laws. It answers a question framed around a national rule that is the sole obstacle, and it does not set out criteria for granting interim relief [1]. The Advocate General discussed substantive criteria, such as a prima facie case, but the Court's operative part does not repeat them [1][2]. The judgment also does not decide whether the rights claimed exist, since the Court was not asked to examine the substance of the provisions relied on [2]. Later judgments cite the case for the general duty of national courts to ensure that EU provisions take full effect [3][4][5]. On this reading, these sources do not show how far the principle reaches in other areas, and this is an assessment, not legal advice [1].

How the sources fit together

The Advocate General, Tesauro, proposed that national courts must be able to grant interim protection on the basis of substantive criteria, not the formal presumption that a statute is valid [2]. The Court's reply does not discuss those substantive criteria and answers only that a national court must set aside a national rule that is the sole obstacle to interim relief [1][2]. The Court relied on the duty of cooperation in Article 5, the Simmenthal case-law and Article 177 [1]. Later judgments cite the case for the principle that national courts must ensure that EU provisions take full effect [3][4][5][6]. One of them links this to the legal protection that persons derive from the direct effect of EU provisions [4]. As far as the sources show, later judgments cite the case for these general points only [3][4][5][6].

From the sources

it is for the national courts, in application of the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, to ensure the legal protection which persons derive from the direct effect of provisions of Community law [1]
a national court which, in a case before it concerning Community law, considers that the sole obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of national law must set aside that rule [1]
The full effectiveness of Community law would be just as much impaired if a rule of national law could prevent a court seised of a dispute governed by Community law from granting interim relief [1]

Sources

  1. Judgment in Case C-213/89: Judgment of the Court of 19 June 1990. — The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others. the judgment · 19 June 1990
  2. Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-213/89: Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 17 May 1990. — The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others. the Advocate General's opinion · 17 May 1990
  3. Judgment in Case C-379/04: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 13 October 2005. — Richard Dahms GmbH v Fränkischer Weinbauverband eV. a later judgment that cites this case · 13 October 2005
  4. Judgment in Case C-226/99: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 11 January 2001. — Siples Srl, in liquidation v Ministero delle Finanze and Servizio della Riscossione dei Tributi - Concessione Pro a later judgment that cites this case · 11 January 2001
  5. Judgment in Case C-253/00: Judgment of the Court of 17 September 2002. — Antonio Muñoz y Cia SA and Superior Fruiticola SA v Frumar Ltd and Redbridge Produce Marketing Ltd. a later judgment that cites this case · 17 September 2002
  6. Judgment in Case C-18/11: Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 6 September 2012. — The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v Philips Electronics UK Ltd. a later judgment that cites this case · 6 September 2012