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Analyses of judgments

When a later, milder law may apply to a fine for a lorry's tachograph

Court of JusticeEmployment and social rightsJudgment in Case C-544/231 August 2025

The question was whether a later, more lenient law must be applied to an administrative fine while it is under appeal in cassation. The Court said yes, if the fine is criminal in nature and the change reflects a new view on punishment.

Read the full judgment

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The case

The driver carried ready-mixed concrete on 4 November 2015 in a vehicle owned by the Slovak company BAJI Trans [1]. The vehicle's tachograph, a device that records driving time, had not had a valid periodic inspection [1]. A national administrative decision fined the driver 200 euros under Slovak law, which implements EU rules requiring tachographs and periodic inspections [1][2]. The regional court dismissed the driver's action on the merits and BAJI Trans' action as inadmissible [1]. The driver and the company then brought an appeal in cassation, a limited further appeal, to the Supreme Court. In 2020 the EU amended Regulation No 561/2006 to list vehicles delivering ready-mixed concrete among those that Member States may exempt from the tachograph obligation [1]. Slovakia then exempted such vehicles [1]. The appellants argued that the new rule should apply to their case. The referring court, the Supreme Administrative Court, asked the Court of Justice how the Charter applies [1].

The question

The Court had to decide whether the Charter's rule on lighter penalties applies to an administrative fine that is criminal in nature. It also had to decide whether a court hearing an appeal in cassation must apply a more lenient law that entered into force after the lower court's ruling, even if national law treats that ruling as final [1].

The outcome

The Court ruled that the lighter-penalty rule can apply to a criminal-type administrative fine that was changed in a more favourable way, if the change reflects a new position on punishment [1]. It also ruled that a cassation court must, in principle, apply such a more lenient law, even if national law treats the lower ruling as final [1]. The Court left it to the referring court to decide whether this fine is criminal in nature [1]. The dispute itself remains with the national court [1].

The Court’s reasoning

The Court first held that Article 51(1) of the Charter applies because Slovakia imposed the penalty under EU tachograph rules and then used the option to exempt certain vehicles [1]. On the lighter-penalty rule, the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter applies only to penalties of a criminal nature. The Court said that this depends on three criteria: the legal classification under national law, the intrinsic nature of the offence, and the severity of the penalty [1]. The fine is administrative under Slovak law, but the other two criteria can still make it criminal. The Court pointed to the punitive aim of the fine and the maximum amount, and it left the assessment to the national court [1]. The rule applies only if the later law reflects a change of position on the criminal classification of the acts or on the penalty [1]. The Court said that Regulation 2020/1054 indicates a change of position by the EU legislature, and that the Slovak change appears to reflect a similar change, which the referring court must verify [1]. On finality, a decision is not final while an ordinary appeal can still be brought within the time limit, even if national law calls that appeal extraordinary [1]. The Court also said the rule has direct effect. If consistent interpretation is not possible and national law does not allow the guarantee to be applied, the national court must set aside conflicting national law [1].

What the judgment means

On this reading, the judgment gives useful guidance for cases where EU rules require penalties. First, the Charter's lighter-penalty rule can apply to a penalty that is criminal in nature, even when national law calls it administrative [1]. Second, a court hearing an appeal in cassation may have to apply a more lenient law that came after the lower ruling, even where national law treats that ruling as final [1]. Third, the Court also addressed the reach of the rule beyond criminal penalties. It held that if the fine is not criminal, no rule of EU law requires the lighter-penalty principle, and it rejected a general EU-law principle covering non-criminal penalties [1]. On this reading, this means that for non-criminal penalties the answer depends on national law and on specific EU provisions, such as the one in Regulation 2988/95 that the Court mentioned [1]. The judgment does not decide whether this particular fine is criminal. That assessment was left to the referring court, which must weigh the punitive purpose and the maximum penalty, including any driving ban [1]. On this reading, the ruling is closely tied to its facts: a change in EU and national rules that reflects a new view on punishing the conduct. Whether other amendments meet that test is not decided here [1]. The Advocate General noted that Member States remain free to apply a wider standard as a national protection [2].

How the sources fit together

The Advocate General proposed that the lighter-penalty principle does not apply, as a general EU principle, to administrative penalties that are not criminal in nature, and that it applies at review stage where the penalty is criminal and the change reflects a change of legislative position [2]. The Court followed this view on the non-criminal point and on the need for a change of position [1][2]. Both the Advocate General and the Court focused on Article 49(1) and Article 51(1) of the Charter and on the EU tachograph rules and the exemption option [1][2]. Later judgments cite this case on the severity test for criminal nature and on the finality of decisions [3][4].

From the sources

provided that that amendment reflects a change of position regarding the criminal classification of the acts committed by that person or regarding the penalty to be applied. [1]
no rule of EU law would require, in this instance, observance of the principle lex mitior. [1]
that decision cannot become final for the purposes of the application of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter until the parties have exhausted that legal remedy [1]

Sources

  1. Judgment in Case C-544/23: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 August 2025. — T.T. and BAJI Trans, s.r. o. v Národný inšpektorát práce. the judgment · 1 August 2025
  2. Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-544/23: Opinion of Advocate General Richard de la Tour delivered on 4 February 2025. — T.T. and BAJI Trans, s.r. o. v Národný inšpektorát práce. the Advocate General's opinion · 4 February 2025
  3. Judgment in Case C-590/24: Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 22 January 2026. — Criminal proceedings against AK Dlhopolec s.r.o. and Others. a later judgment that cites this case · 22 January 2026
  4. Judgment in Case C-280/25: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2026. — Criminal proceedings against M.G.D. a later judgment that cites this case · 16 July 2026