Digital Rights Ireland: EU data retention directive struck down as invalid
In Digital Rights Ireland, the Court was asked whether the EU directive requiring communications data to be retained is compatible with the Charter's privacy rights. It held the directive invalid because it went beyond what is strictly necessary.
The case
Directive 2006/24 required providers of publicly available electronic communications services to retain certain traffic and location data for between six months and two years, so that the data would be available for fighting serious crime [1]. In Ireland, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, a company that owned a mobile phone registered on 3 June 2006, sued Irish ministers, the police commissioner, Ireland and the Attorney General. It challenged Irish data retention measures and asked for the directive to be declared invalid [1]. The High Court referred questions to the Court of Justice [1]. In Austria, the government of the Province of Carinthia and thousands of individual applicants asked the Constitutional Court to annul Paragraph 102a of the 2003 telecommunications law, which transposed the directive [1]. That court also referred questions, asking whether the directive was compatible with Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [1]. The two cases were joined for the oral procedure and the judgment [1].
The question
The Court had to decide whether Directive 2006/24, which required the retention of communications data, was valid in light of the Charter, in particular Article 7 (respect for private life) and Article 8 (protection of personal data) [1].
The outcome
The Court declared Directive 2006/24 invalid [1]. It found that the directive caused a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, which was not limited to what is strictly necessary [1]. It therefore did not need to examine Article 11 or answer the other questions [1].
The Court’s reasoning
The Court first held that retaining the data, and giving authorities access to it, interferes with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter [1]. The data, taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions about people's private lives, such as daily movements and social relationships [1]. The Court found the interference wide-ranging and particularly serious [1]. It did not affect the essence of the rights, because the content of communications could not be retained [1]. It also met an objective of general interest, namely the fight against serious crime and public security [1]. The retention was appropriate for that objective [1]. The decisive issue was necessity. Because of the seriousness of the interference, the EU legislature's discretion was reduced and review had to be strict [1]. Derogations from data protection must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary [1]. The directive covered all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data, without differentiation, limitation or exception [1]. It set no objective criteria for access or for what counted as serious crime, and it made access dependent on no prior review by a court or independent body [1]. The retention period had no criteria tied to what was strictly necessary [1]. Its security rules were also insufficient, and it did not require the data to be kept within the EU [1]. The EU legislature therefore exceeded the limits of proportionality [1].
What the judgment means
On this reading, the judgment establishes that blanket retention of communications data is hard to justify under the Charter. The Court tied its reasoning to the seriousness of the interference and the need for clear and precise rules with minimum safeguards [1]. On this reading, the passages on missing limits (time period, geography, persons concerned) and on missing prior review by a court or independent body show what the Court looked for [1]. Later judgments rely on these passages. One cites paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 for the requirement of strict necessity and for the need for safeguards where data is processed automatically [3]. Another cites paragraphs 57 and 58 on the lack of any link between the data and a threat [4]. Others cite paragraph 28 on freedom of expression [6] and paragraph 59 on data that must contribute to fighting serious crime [7]. The judgment does not, on the sources before us, rule on any specific national scheme. It decides the validity of the directive itself [1]. A later judgment notes that national legislation can still fall within the Charter's scope even though the directive was annulled [5]. How far any given national rule would pass the test is a separate question that we do not assess here.
How the sources fit together
The Court relied on Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter, and on Directives 95/46 and 2002/58, which the directive derogated from [1]. It referred to Advocate General Cruz Villalón's Opinion several times, including on the wide-ranging interference and the feeling of constant surveillance [1]. His Opinion also treated the directive as a particularly serious interference with privacy [2]. The Opinion is only partly reproduced here, so we cannot compare his conclusion with the Court's. Later judgments cite the case on strict necessity and safeguards [3], on the lack of any link between data and a threat [4], on freedom of expression [4][6] and on serious crime [7]. One notes that the directive was annulled but national law can still fall under the Charter [5].
From the sources
Directive 2006/24 covers, in a generalised manner, all persons and all means of electronic communication as well as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime. [1]
derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary [1]
by adopting Directive 2006/24, the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter. [1]
Sources
- Judgment in Case C-293/12: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 8 April 2014. — Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesr the judgment · 8 April 2014
- Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-293/12: Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 12 December 2013. — Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natura the Advocate General's opinion · 12 December 2013
- Judgment in Case C-362/14: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015. — Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. a later judgment that cites this case · 6 October 2015
- Judgment in Case C-623/17: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2020. — Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Others. a later judgment that cites this case · 6 October 2020
- Judgment in Case C-207/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 October 2018. — Proceedings brought by Ministerio Fiscal. a later judgment that cites this case · 2 October 2018
- Judgment in Case C-511/18: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2020. — La Quadrature du Net and Others v Premier ministre and Others. a later judgment that cites this case · 6 October 2020
- Judgment in Case C-140/20: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 April 2022. — G.D. v The Commissioner of the Garda Síochána and Others. a later judgment that cites this case · 5 April 2022